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A Social License to Operate: Corporate Social Responsibility, local communities, and 
the constitution of Global Production Networks 
 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper contributes to the theorisation of the role of informal regulation (undertaken by 
lead firms) in the ongoing organisation of global production networks.   It does so through a 
qualitative case-study of BHP Billiton’s Ravensthorpe Nickel Operation (RNO) in the rural 
Shire of Ravensthorpe in Western Australia. This less tangible, and to date under-researched, 
dimension of global production networks is fore-grounded through a focus on the corporate 
social responsibility strategy implemented by RNO in the service of achieving/demonstrating 
a broader ‘Social License to Operate.’ This ‘licence’ functions—beyond the corporation—as 
a legitimated/ing multi-scalar mechanism through which to gain and maintain access to 
mineral resources, and thus establish viable and ongoing global production networks.  
Further, this informal regulation is shown to shape social relations and qualities of place 
conducive to competitive global mineral extraction and to facilitate the positioning of local 
communities and places in mineral global production networks.  
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Introduction 
While formal regulatory systems are important in the shaping of global production, this paper 
is concerned with the rise of an equally important, and interrelated, informal social regulation 
as articulated in the concept of the ‘Social License to Operate’ (SLO).  This corporate 
concept and related practices have gained considerable traction in global extractive industries 
as a strategic management response to increasing critique of the sector’s well-documented, 
world-wide track record as socially and environmentally damaging (Yakovleva 2005; Joyce 
and Thomson 2000; Bridge 2008). The high-profile 2002 global Mining, Minerals and 
Sustainable Development report prepared by the International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED) directly links the SLO not only to the success of the industry but also its 
very survival (see also Owen and Kemp 2013).  The industry was found to be “distrusted by 
many of the people it deals with day to day” and as having failed “to convince some of its 
constituents and stakeholders that it has the social license to operate in many parts of the 
world, based on the many expectations of its potential contributions” (IIED 2002: xiv). As the 
report goes on to make clear, it is not only the expectations of local communities that matter 
in gaining/maintaining an SLO but also those of a range of other groups operating at national 
and global scales, such as countries, sector employees, campaigners for human rights, and 
consumers.  
 
The SLO continues to be important in/to the industry having risen from fifth place in the 
Ernst and Young 2010 list of top ten business risks in mining and metals to third place in its 
2014-15 list. Along with the risks posed by community activism, evidenced by a reported 
steady rise in the number of projects that have been slowed down or even halted by such 
action, Ernst and Young (2014: 17) highlight ‘complications’ arising from the involvement of 
groups “not considered to be traditionally part of the local community,” namely ethical 
investment groups, and buyers and customers concerned to distance themselves from 
unethical business practice.  The risks posed by a failure to gain an SLO from these groups 
are noted to encompass the loss of “potential investment streams, supply chain and customer 
base challenges, and of course, reputational damage” (Ernst and Young 2014: 17).  At the 
same time, the presence or absence of an SLO at the community or site-specific scale has 
wider/multi-scalar consequences, particularly in terms of access to new/future resources and 
downstream sales. Recent calculations of the business costs for the mining industry arising 
from conflict with local communities, for example, demonstrate that the most substantial 
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costs in fact arise from “lost value linked to future projects, expansion plans, or sales that did 
not go ahead” (Davis and Franks 2014:9).   
 
The importance of the SLO is not only promoted by global and national industry peak bodies, 
and business advisors, but is also supported by a growing and dedicated consultancy industry, 
and features in the public documentation of leading mining corporations.   BHP Billiton 
(2005:61), for example, refers to the “licence to operate and grow” the company: 
Access to resources is crucial to the sustainability of our business. Fundamental to 
achieving access to resources is effectively addressing heightened political and 
societal expectations related to the environmental and social aspects of our business.   
Moreover, interconnections between community ‘trust’ and legal regulation, and attendant 
extra-local dimensions, are explicitly acknowledged in the corporate definition of the SLO as 
“securing and maintaining the trust and confidence of a community and regulators in order to 
set up and conduct business” (BHP Billiton 2005: 13 emphasis added).  It can also be part of 
an attempt to “become the ‘miner of choice’ for governments and communities, lenders, 
potential and current employees, institutional investors and ordinary shareholders” which, as 
Welker (2009:13) notes, was important to the CSR business case put forward by Newmont 
managers.   
 
From a global extractive industry perspective, the SLO is clearly relevant to the structure and 
maintenance of resource global production networks, and at more than ‘just’ the local 
community level/scale—which nevertheless remains important to a broader social licence.  
At present, however, much of the academic literature on the SLO (reviewed below) has 
tended to focus on local dimensions of SLO practices.  This paper, in contrast, seeks to 
address the question of how the local community-based SLO is deployed by corporations at 
extra-local scales and/or in multi-scalar ways in support of enabling and legitimating mining 
GPNs.  In doing so, the paper contributes to the GPN literature addressing the political and 
discursive aspects of global production networks, not least around the development and 
application of informal norms. The paper thus makes two interrelated contributions: first, it 
offers a needed global/ multi-scalar perspective on SLO and, second, it contributes to a still 
emergent body of empirical work on informal regulation in GPN. 
 
Specifically, the multi-scalar application of the SLO is explored through a qualitative case-
study of BHP Billiton’s AU$ 2.2 billion Ravensthorpe Nickel Operation (RNO) located in the 
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rural shire of Ravensthorpe1 in Western Australia. Of interest is the Community Liaison 
Committee initiated by RNO as a key implementation of industry ‘best-practice’ corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) policies and standards. Importantly, this committee is central to 
corporate claims to having an SLO.  The case study is based on empirical data collected by 
the author between 2006 and 2008 as part of an ethnography focussed on the social dynamics 
attending the arrival and presence of RNO in the Shire of Ravensthorpe.  One strand of this 
research focussed on the particularities of Ravensthorpe’s insertion into, and reconfiguration 
within, the spaces and flows of global mining capital. The data includes a substantial, 
systematically-collected corpus of industry and corporate communications such as publically 
available stakeholder reports. This paper examines these documents in relation to what this 
paper argues is the corporate discursive integration of the Ravensthorpe operation into its 
intra-firm and global production networks, and the representation and deployment of its 
community engagement in Ravensthorpe, exemplified by the Community Liaison 
Committee, as a signifier of the presence of an SLO.  The 2005 BHP Billiton Sustainability 
Report in particular is drawn on in the development of my argument that these documents 
assist in configuring a ‘socially-licensed’ global production network, and situate local 
communities, in this case Ravensthorpe, as (a legitimating) part of this network.    
 
Over 120 predominantly face-to-face, semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted over the 
course of the larger project also inform the analysis.  This sample includes substantial 
representation of both pre- and post-mine local residents across the Shire’s three place-based 
communities, along with mining company staff and government representatives directly 
involved in development and community aspects of RNO. Empirical evidence is drawn 
largely from interviews undertaken with the majority of local Community Liaison Committee 
members, and also Jerdacuttup Working Group members (introduced below). All interviews 
were recorded, professionally transcribed, and de-identified. The transcripts have been 
iteratively analysed with a focus on perceptions of BHP Billiton /RNO’s social license and 
the functioning of the Community Liaison Committee.  This involved identification of core 
themes around the acceptance and/or rejection of BHP Billiton/RNO’s presence in terms of 
an SLO, and in relation to the function of the Community Liaison Committee in this regard.    
 
The paper commences with a discussion of the concept of the SLO and its application in the 
mining industry with reference to emerging academic literature in the area. Resource global 
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production networks, as exemplified by BHP Billiton and RNO, are then examined through a 
GPN lens with attention to the relevance of the SLO to the construction and understanding of 
these networks. Thereafter the empirical analysis explores local Ravensthorpe perceptions 
and experiences of the SLO as constructed in and through the Community Liaison Committee 
before addressing the corporate deployment of the committee as signifier of an SLO in its 
broader public appropriation of Ravensthorpe as a ‘socio-economic’ case study.  Juxtaposing 
these two aspects brings to the fore interrelations of local and extra-local politics of the SLO 
cognizant of their broader role in the service of the firm’s global production networks. The 
conclusion then briefly examines case study implications around informal regulatory 
strategies as hegemonic mechanisms.   
  
 
The Social License to (Continue to) Mine   
The concept of the SLO has emerged in economically-advanced democratic countries since 
the mid-1990s as a result of a growing corporate awareness that compliance with legal 
regulations is no longer sufficient to ensure broad social acceptance of a given business 
activity (Gunningham et al 2004). This awareness is in turn understood to derive from the 
increasing capacities of NGOs, Civil Society Organisations and local communities to 
pressure businesses and governments to address their concerns and expectations regarding 
industry behaviours, practices and consequences, and to behave ‘responsibly’. Not 
surprisingly, the notion of the SLO is especially important to industries with visible and/or 
substantial environmental and social consequences, such as pulp and paper manufacturing 
(Gunningham et al 2004), wind power harnessing (Corvellec 2007; Hall 2014) and, in 
particular, mining (Owen and Kemp 2013; Parsons et al 2014). Some claim that the mining 
industry has led the way in the development of the SLO (see Boutelier et al 2012)  just as  
examples of failures of the SLO are often drawn from the mining industry (eg Banks 1993; 
Gunningham et al 2004). 
 
Following Joyce and Thomson (2000), the SLO is widely defined in the academic literature 
as involving the continuing ‘acceptance or approval’ of a development (eg mining operation) 
specifically on the part of the local community2 and others with a vested interest (see Parsons 
et al 2014; Moffat and Zhang 2014; Hall 2014); some scholars qualify this through reference 
to a capacity to impact on profitability (Parsons et al 2014; Moffat and Zhang 2014).  
Crucially, as widely noted in the academic literature at large, the SLO is intangible, 
6 
 
6 
 
ephemeral and fragile (eg Gunningham et al 2004; Owen and Kemp 2013).   It is not 
embodied in a concrete agreement or document.  This understanding is also evident in the 
Australian minerals industry:  for example, the Minerals Council of Australia (2005) defines 
the SLO an “unwritten social contract.” Its terms and governance aspects are “rarely, if ever, 
elaborated by proponents” (Owen and Kemp 2013: 33) and are indeed open at any time “to 
interpretation, negotiation and company-initiated amendment” (Gunningham et al 2004: 329).  
Though (mining) industry consultants expend considerable energy developing and promoting 
the SLO as an essential and measurable management tool (see for example Boutilier et al 
2012; KPMG 2013), its existence is taken for granted in the absence of explicit resistance or 
contestation (Owen and Kemp 2013). It is also an “inflated” concept in that “companies can 
and do operate even when their social licence has been called into question on a global scale” 
(Owen and Kemp 2013: 32). In this regard what is important to industry is the three 
substantial and interlinked common firm-level benefits of having an SLO identified in the 
scholarly business literature: risk minimisation3, enhanced reputation, and ability to resist 
pressures for increased external regulation (Gunningham et al 2004; see also Kapelus 2002). 
All of these benefits inform the mining industry’s conceptualisation and use of the SLO.  
  
As noted above, local communities tend to be privileged in both mining industry discourse 
and practice. This is not surprising given the almost inevitable adverse effects of mining 
operations on sections of the local community (Kapelus 2002; Rifai-Hasan 2010); the 
potential costs of community activism/resistance to the smooth and timely operation of a 
given project (and risks to GPNs) (Jenkins 2004; Welker 2009); the fact that relocation is 
often not an option as it might be in other industries; and, a competitive environment believed 
to favour companies that can demonstrate commitment to community relations and codes of 
ethics (Humphreys 2000; MCA 2005). CSR strategies and programs are “the most utilized 
market-oriented tools for obtaining an SLO in the mining sector” (Prno and Slocombe 2012: 
352). As implemented by the extractive sector, ‘gaining and maintaining’ the social license 
typically involves social performance reporting and the design and implementation of formal 
strategies for community engagement and development.4 Community engagement can take 
the form of information evenings; liaison committees made up of community, NGO, industry 
and other actors; public communications; community investment programs; and dedicated 
community relationship staff portfolios. 
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Local communities are also privileged in the academic literature as the core locus/target for 
gaining an SLO, which is in turn focussed on individual operations (Prno and Slocombe 
2012; Joyce and Thomson 2000; Boutilier and Thomson 2011; Prno and Scott 2012).  This 
emerging work has largely concentrated on determining/exploring local community 
expectations, factors, and engagement underpinning the presence of an SLO (Moffat and 
Zhang 2014; Prno 2013; Mitchell and McManus 2013); and, relatedly, on the development of 
SLO models and engagement frameworks (eg. Hall 2014; Prno 2013).  At an extra-local 
scale, firm level and mine-manger’s understandings of the SLO in the Australian mining 
industry have begun to  be examined (Bice 2014; Parsons et al 2014), along with expectations 
on part of the broader public (Mason et al 2014).  Scholars have also critically interrogated 
the concept’s function and industry usage/value (Owen and Kemp 2013), and begun to 
address the role of broader social discourses in the construction of industry-specific SLOs 
(Edwards and Lacey 2014).  In considering a multiplicity of ‘public interests’ in shaping the 
SLO in relation to specific forestry practices in Sweden, Edwards and Lacey (2014) identify a 
situation in which “local impacts and the concerns of local communities” are not prioritised 
over global impacts; this they suggest is the opposite of “very localised” mining sector SLOs 
as examined in the extant literature.   A further, as yet unaddressed aspect of the relationship 
of local and global expectations in determining conditions for an SLO is the interrelation of 
localised SLOs and the construction of a broader multi-scalar SLO, in pursuit of a 
competitive GPN, as examined here.  This connection to global production is salient in light 
of Levy’s (2008: 947) problematisation of the way in which “([e]thics and CSR perspectives 
have tended to view corporate practices, prices and working conditions as matters of 
managerial discretion rather than an outcome of production networks as economic, political, 
and ideological systems.”  In a similar fashion, the SLO literature has tended to emphasise 
the role of “managerial discretion” in the presence and quality of an SLO.  
 
Global production networks and extractive industries 
As Coe et al (2008) have noted, scholarly engagement with the complexities of contemporary 
global economic organisation is both vitally important and rife with conceptual and empirical 
challenges.   Relatedly, examination of global production is characterised by ongoing debate 
occurring, in particular, around the scope and explanatory capacities of global value chain 
(GVC) and global production network (GPN) approaches.5 Though neither of these literatures 
are homogenous (Gibbon et al 2008), GVC analyses tend to foreground inter-firm relations 
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(eg Gereffi et al 2005) while GPN approaches aim for greater inclusivity (eg. Henderson et al 
2002; Coe et al 2008). The scholarly literature on GPNs highlights the multidimensional 
interconnections, across national geographies, of the “functions, operations and transactions 
through which a specific product or service is produced, distributed and consumed” (Coe et al 
2008: 274).  An important aspect of this global production suggested (though 
underdeveloped) in the GPN approach is that of intra-firm relations and of firms themselves 
as “networks embedded within networks” (Coe et al 2008: 277; see also Dicken 2000).  
Further, these multiple and layered interconnections are formed through a range of non-linear 
movements of capital, in various forms such as “commodities and money, knowledge and 
people,” between a range of “nodes, sites and spaces (of production, exchange and 
consumption)” (Hudson 2008: 422).   
A GPN approach thus elucidates BHP Billiton, and its RNO, as a complex and dynamic intra-
firm network made up of discrete, geographically dispersed management functions and 
heterogeneous grounded mine operations. BHP Billiton, at the time of its development of 
RNO, was the world’s third-largest nickel supplier, and the world’s largest mining company, 
employing “41,000 employees, and 61,000 contractors, working in more than 100 
operations” (BHPB 2008: 6). In 2005 the firm  encompassed, across nineteen countries,  
some twenty-six offices (encompassing corporate centres, marketing offices, exploration 
offices and technology centres) and forty-nine mine operations in fifteen countries (BHPB 
2005: 4).  The company’s nickel “assets” in 2006 included the Cerro Matoso mine and 
ferronickel smelter in Colombia; QNI Yabulu refinery in north Queensland, Australia; and 
the extensive Nickel West assets in Western Australia, encompassing operations at Mt Keith 
and Leinster, a nickel smelter and concentrator in Kalgoorlie, the Kwinana nickel refinery, 
and RNO “in an advanced construction phase” (BHPB 2006: 154).  These various operations 
were organised into seven “customer-oriented groupings called Customer Sector Groups, 
each of which “is a substantial business in its own right” with the “autonomy to optimise their 
businesses, with clear accountabilities” (BHPB 2005). The firm’s nickel mines and refineries 
were part of the ‘Stainless Steel Materials’ Customer Sector Group (BHPB 2005).  
 
As O’Neill (2012:82) points out in his case study of the exemplary development of BHP 
Billiton as an “advanced global corporation,” the maximisation of shareholder returns 
requires attending to the firms “physical organization,” that is, “getting administration and 
location structures right,” and also the coordination of “local knowledge” across this complex 
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intra-firm network. O’Neill’s study of BHP Billiton is also useful here in understanding the 
firm’s CSR antecedents and the way that addressing CSR shortcomings involved reshaping 
the firm and its governance.   In the late 1980s and mid 1990s explosions and worker 
fatalities occurred at two Australian mine sites, and  environmental damage to the OK Tedi 
River in Papua New Guinea, as a result of the company’s copper and gold mining in the area, 
received substantial critical attention around the world not least in the popular media (O’Neill 
2012: 84). O’Neill (2012) argues that these events highlighted the inadequacies of the 
company’s health and safety practices, ethics guidelines, and capacities for mobilising a 
suitable public response.   As a result of these events, the firm increased the power of its 
financial and consumer departments while reducing the power of those concerned with 
engineering and production; developed a range of best-practice policies; and improved 
internal governance processes (O’Neill 2012: 85).   
 
Individual mine-sites (such as RNO) and groupings of operations (such as the Stainless Steel 
Materials Customer Sector Group) are of course also part of a number of specific BHP 
Billiton-led resource GPNs. RNO is connected to other BHP Billiton production sites, such as 
the Yabulu refinery and through this to a range of downstream actors.  RNO can also be 
understood as made possible, and shaped, by flows of, for example, workers, money, 
knowledge into Ravensthorpe, as the product of a confluence of external and local factors 
such as the specific qualities of the local nickel reserves and highly competitive labour 
market at that time. For example, the firm traded on the mine’s proximity to the ocean as a 
means to attract workers just as the firm’s development of an “Enhanced Pressure Acid 
Leaching (EPAL),” process made nickel extraction from the local laterite ore body possible 
(BHPB 2006: 130).  This technological access is just one dimension of the establishment and 
maintenance of a global extractive production network which requires lead firms to 
competitively manage, increase and/or replace viable/quality stocks of what are essentially 
non-renewable resources (Bridge 2008). Non-extractive global production networks are 
shaped by the mobility of capital in search of places and conditions which best lend 
themselves to the accumulation of profit (Harvey 2006).6  Extractive industries, on the other 
hand, by virtue of the place-bound nature of extraction, are not characterised by the same 
degree of mobility or locational dynamism in production (see Bridge 2008). In short, mining 
global production networks are structured around gaining and maintaining profitable (and 
stable) access to ore bodies in a wide variety of places and local socio-cultural conditions. 
The place-bound nature of extraction means that lead firms are forced to engage with the 
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complex and often messy social and political relations constituted in and by a number of 
places. As this suggests, access to the desired ore body involves a variety of firm and non-
firm actors.  
 
A GPN framework is useful here in its attention to the ways in which a variety of firm and 
non-firm actors shape, indeed are constituent of, global production (Henderson et al, 2002; 
Coe et al 2008). Such actors include “different types of firms as well as non-firm actors, such 
as the state, international organizations, labour groups, consumers, and civil society 
organizations, in diverse localities” (Yeung and Coe 2015: 32). The extractive sector is 
territorially embedded in the structures of the nation-state by virtue of the state’s normative 
ownership of mineral and other primary resource commodities and its role in determining the 
conditions of access. Accordingly, the state is a significant, potentially powerful non-firm 
actor in resource global production networks, which in turn are shaped by the “tension 
between resource-holding states and resource-seeking firms,” particularly around 
opportunities for value capture at the point of assigning access and rent allocation (Bridge 
2008: 402).  In the particular case of RNO, negotiations with the state around the conditions 
of access and the value capture included the development of the Ravensthorpe Nickel Project 
Memorandum of Understanding, which committed the firm and various state parties to 
undertake specific actions necessary for the viable extraction of ore.  For example, BHP 
Billiton investment in a locally-based workforce, contributing to state agendas around rural 
development, was supported by the state’s commitment to building a primary school, 
upgrading of the local high school and local roads, the construction of a water treatment 
plant, and facilitation of residential land development. 
 
Additionally, as articulated in the concept of the SLO companies need to negotiate access 
with local communities not least as front-line site of extraction.  As described by BHP 
Billiton, the development of RNO involved substantive and ongoing “collaboration of local, 
state and federal governments, community and private enterprise” (BHPB 2008:1). 
Importantly, GPNs are shaped not only by collaboration but also by contestation among 
diverse firm and non-firm actors (Levy 2008). Further, relations among actors can 
incorporate an “ever-changing mixture” of collaboration and contestation (Coe et al 2008: 
288).  As Levy (2008:943) argues GPNs are entangled with “charged social and political 
issues.” He uses the examples of sweatshop labour conditions, and poor returns for coffee 
growers to demonstrate the ways that multi-national corporations are subject to a growing 
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pressure to attend to “social issues” connected with their international activities. Examples of 
this in the mining sector are abundant, in particular around environmental damages and 
adverse experiences of local communities.  It is precisely these pressures, as noted above, that 
inform the industry development and use of the SLO.   
 
Particularly useful for understanding the role of local non-firm actors and the SLO in the case 
of RNO, and ultimately broader intra-firm and mineral-specific GPNs, is Levy’s (2008) 
extension of Gramsci’s work on hegemony to the study of these “conflictual social issues in 
international arenas engaging business and other societal actors.” As Levy notes (2008:951), 
‘hegemony’ refers, in the context of a conceptualisation of “society as a complex, dynamic 
system of structures and forces operating at multiple levels,” to “a condition of relative 
stability in this system” attended by the presence of dominant groups and alliances.  In 
Gramscian understandings this stability is achieved and maintained, not so much by the use 
of force, but rather by “the winning of consent” from subordinate groups through social and 
cultural processes, representations and ideologies, or “ways of making sense of the world,” in 
which the interests of subordinate and dominant groups are presented as aligned (O’Sullivan 
et al 1996: 133). In Levy’s (2008:952) summation, hegemony suggests a “subtle balance of 
ideology that legitimates the outcomes of a system, substantive concessions to weaker 
groups, and a degree of economic and political coercion.”  As he (2008) demonstrates, the 
development of codes of conduct on the part of industry bodies in the wake of public concern 
over the low returns accruing to coffee growers can be understood as a political attempt to 
preserve the GPNs hegemonic stability in the face of challenges to its legitimacy.   
Specifically, the application of these codes and the involvement of NGOs, he argues (2008), 
changed a conflictual relationship into one of collaboration, thereby incorporating these 
NGOs as part of the hegemonic alliance.  This industry accommodation to social pressure 
allowed it to claim “moral and intellectual leadership” (2008:954) and an alignment of 
corporate objectives and the public interest. In his (2008:954) words, this “is the essence of 
hegemony.”  Importantly, hegemonic stability requires ongoing effort as a result precisely of 
the conflicts of interest and inequalities produced in contemporary forms of (global) 
economic organisation (O’Sullivan et al 1996: 133).  The notion of hegemony offers a 
powerful lens through which to examine the SLO, and the ‘winning of consent’ it implies, as 
a voluntary and informal form of adjustment to external pressure which may function to 
stabilise and legitimise mining global production networks.    
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(Re) creating the Shire of Ravensthorpe as ‘mining town’  
In the case of RNO local consent was sought / claimed in relation to substantial and wide-
ranging transformations of the local landscape and senses of place. RNO was a powerful 
presence in each of the Shire’s three, small, place-based communities of Ravensthorpe 
(through which construction materials and then large consignments of supplies and ores were 
transported), Jerdacuttup (site of extraction) and Hopetoun (a very small coastal town where 
the majority of mine workers came to live). Ravensthorpe’s development as a site of 
production encompassed substantial changes to the physical environment (through, for 
example, the removal of Bandalup Hill, the building of over 300 houses to accommodate 
mine workers) and to local senses of place (again for example, as a result of the arrival of a 
resident mine-worker population in Hopetoun larger than the pre-existing population).7 
Ravensthorpe was thus not only connected to other sites and functions in the BHP Billiton 
intra-firm network and nickel global production network but was also transformed by these 
connections, both physically and, less concretely, in terms of the conceptualization of 
Ravensthorpe as a new/different kind of place and community, for example as ‘mining town’ 
(and also as part of BHP Billiton’s networks as examined below).    
 
This extent (and fast pace) of change, and relatively high level of risk around community 
dissatisfaction and/or resistance was managed by the corporation through a clearly defined 
CSR strategy.   The local implementation of BHP Billiton company-wide CSR policy was 
informed by the broader policies and frameworks endorsed by mining industry peak 
organisations such as the International Council of Mining and Metals and, at the national-
scale, the Minerals Council of Australia.  RNO CSR strategies thus enact a 
transnational/global coordination of BHP Billiton corporate social responsibility ethos and 
practice, in line with international and national ‘best practice’. That is, it reproduces global 
industry and company norms.  Specifically, these global/company-wide CSR policies and 
approaches were manifest in Ravensthorpe in the form of two RNO-initiated and controlled 
community groups—the Community Liaison Committee and the Jerdacuttup RNO Working 
Group—the regular production of Community Newsletters, and a local investment strategy.   
The Community Liaison Committee was an important part of the overall program, as 
evidenced for example by its consistent promotion in the Community Newsletters as the point 
of contact for local residents.  Established by RNO in 2002, the Community Liaison 
Committee was presented by the company as “an information exchange forum” which met 
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bi-monthly to “identify key issues and opportunities for community development” (RNO 
2009: 16).   
 
Committee members included BHP Billiton staff, invited representatives from “seven non-
government organisations” (such as the Hopetoun Progress Association) and from the local 
government of the Shires of Ravensthorpe and the neighbouring Shire of Esperance, along 
with an ‘independent academic’ and the Chair of the Jerdacuttup Working Group.  
Importantly, the Community Liaison Committee did not have any decision-making 
capacities, was explicitly described as “not a lobby group” (RNO 2002: 3), and over time 
became principally associated with assessing applications from local community groups for 
small grants.   The Jerdacuttup RNO working group—though also set up and controlled by 
RNO—had its roots in demands from local farmers to have a separate mechanism to address 
their specific (literally, ‘next-door-neighbour’) concerns.  Membership was restricted to 
representatives from nearby farms, RNO staff and a technical consultant (to explain technical 
documents).  As such, this working group represents a local adaptation of the corporate wide 
strategy: it was, however, clearly positioned in the corporate narrative as “a member” of the 
Community Liaison Committee (BHPB 2005: 376). BHP Billiton’s local implementation of a 
CSR strategy in pursuit of an SLO was explicitly designed to assist local adaptation to the 
logic and needs of profitable nickel production. The Community Liaison Committee’s role in 
this, from the perspective of the firm, is very clear.  BHP Billiton’s 2005 Sustainability 
Report (376), for example, asserted that the committee “was formed to help the wider 
regional community to adapt to the arrival of a major mining and processing operation.”   
 
Living the network: local perceptions 
Interviews with those who experienced the arrival of BHP Billiton/RNO and the attendant 
local changes demonstrate how incorporation into the nickel production network transforms 
“how people understand themselves, their connections and the places they inhabit” (Quastel 
2011: 452). Such transformation is powerfully evident in long-term, pre-mine local residents’ 
perceptions of the arrival of the mine and consequent sense of ‘being on the map’ and of 
grappling with new or changing relational senses of place.   For example, as one interviewee 
put it:  
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It’s not Ravens-where? any more.  It’s Ravensthorpe where the nickel mine is, you 
know BHP8 and everything that that entails. It’s almost like we’ve all been 
discovered. (LX) 
Relatedly, there was a strong sense of being involved in a messy, shifting and unclear if not 
contradictory set of relations. Interviewees directly involved in local governance and/or who 
sat on the Community Liaison Committee or the Jerdacuttup Working Group frequently made 
comments to the effect that “the average person has no idea of what’s involved” in engaging 
with the corporation: 
 It’s a lot more complex than even I understand.  Even I don’t fully understand the 
complexities of this and the many layers of the politics of it. (SO) 
Part of the recounted sense of messiness and local confusion centred around who—as in BHP 
Billiton; RNO management;  private contractors;  local, state or national government 
agencies—was responsible for what.    
At the same time, a small number of interviewees made reference to BHP Billiton’s size and 
social record, as in the following:  
I was always pretty happy with the fact that it was BHP and you know they do sort of 
have a ... you know an international reputation to maintain and to that end I think 
they’re doing what they can. Big companies have to be a whole lot more accountable 
than small companies. (KR) 
The above perception/expectation depends on, and reproduces, a sense or understanding of 
BHP Billiton as coherent and homogenous. Also consistently articulated in the interviews, 
was a sense of being “overwhelmed by the power of an organisation like BHP” (M 45RT).  
Interviewees directly related this power to the size of the corporation—and the company’s 
own media/community engagement materials, consistently emphasize its position standing as 
“the world’s largest mining company”. As one interviewee pithily expressed it: “BHP are so 
big they call the tune” (48RT). The extent of the corporate network was a further dimension:  
And big companies like BHP, they’ve got people in parliament and government and 
everywhere. And I think too a lot of people felt too, what’s the use of protesting. (DL)   
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With Billiton, they’re a huge company and they set out to achieve profits. And so 
everything is aimed at making life good for their shareholders and good for their staff 
and retaining staff. (SO) 
Corporate size and (extra-local) reputation—and thus corporate promotions of this and the 
work undertaken in creating a sense of rational unified accountability—informs a local sense 
that the firm is trustworthy, and also works to undermine potential resistance.   
 
In terms of the local experience, the arrival of RNO is not ‘just’ about local impacts and 
concerns but is also about a sense of being a (small, overwhelmed) part of something large, 
powerful, complex and political. While the firm is seen as rational and unified, the relations 
arising from RNO’s presence are experienced as messy. At the same time the firm’s broader, 
extra-local reputation is important in terms of perceptions of risk to the local community from 
the mine’s presence. Taken together these experiences suggest a reduced community capacity 
to understand the situation, and thus award an SLO, along with high risks on the ground for 
the corporation in terms of highly unstable local expectations.   
 
However, according to the basic logic of determining the presence of an SLO, namely the 
absence of overt resistance, BHP Billiton seemingly enjoyed a social licence to operate its 
nickel mine.  Overt and/or organised resistance to the mine operation or the corporation was 
almost entirely absent in Ravensthorpe (and elsewhere). This was despite a clear and 
sustained undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the presence of RNO evident throughout the 
interviews with local residents and gaining momentum as time passed. Such dissatisfaction 
and, in many cases, grave concerns were focussed on a raft of local economic, environmental 
and social consequences of the operation and also many aspects of BHP Billiton’s 
management of social relations. This absence of visible resistance can be explained as the 
result of a wide-spread local perception that “All we can do is work with it as opposed to 
spending all of our energies fighting it” (SO).  Though ostensibly a result of the power of 
local communities to challenge corporate actions, the SLO in this case can be argued to rely 
on a local sense of disempowerment. That is, local residents understood the presence of the 
mine, and its particular modes of operation, as a fait accompli based on the size and influence 
of the corporation, and the accepted subordinate position of the local community.  
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Importantly, there was a clear perception of expediency in BHP Billiton’s community 
engagement strategies:    
The mentality though is … it’s … they think, look what we’ve done for you.  And 
we’re going, but we never wanted it. (DL) 
Corporate actions were experienced / perceived by those closely engaged by the corporation 
by way of committee and working group memberships as not only self-serving but as a 
means to purchase an SLO:   
I have to say BHP is an animal that just will do exactly as it wants. Has absolutely no 
care. Everything it does, it has an ulterior motive behind it, even paying the 
community [through grants to local community groups]... all has a motive, of course 
it’s to keep everyone on side. (50RT) 
You’re being lobbied by BHP Billiton. They’re trying to drive change, they’re trying 
to drive things to suit themselves. But if they want to drive everything and that’s 
probably why to an extent they pay this money [grants to local groups], is because at 
the end of the day they feel that they’ve bought that right. (SO) 
As part of the broader awareness of BHP Billiton’s power infusing a large number of 
interviews, and committee members’ perceptions of the firm’s insistence on “doing it the 
BHP way regardless” (J06) of community concerns or expectations,  a number of 
interviewees noted a sense that BHP Billiton was threatening to withdraw if things didn’t go 
its way.  For example, a committee-member interviewee closely involved in processes which 
saw the Shire reject a particular corporate request/expectation, described how company 
representatives made it very clear that “elements of BHP Billiton are questioning whether the 
community wants us here or not.” This was done in such a way as to constitute a veiled threat 
of firm withdrawal form community engagement, and a reduction in corporate largess. This 
can be read as an inversion of the SLO in which the corporation is threatening to withdraw its 
support for the community (if the SLO and associated local support is not forthcoming). It 
also affirms the limits of informal regulation such as the SLO: if community relationships and 
expectations are too onerous for the firm, if the community does not behave/comply as 
expected by the corporation, the result can become withdrawal of investment rather than 
changes to corporate behaviour and expectations (see Quastel 2011).   
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Though the Community Liaison Committee from the firm’s perspective was an important 
part of its CSR strategy and overall SLO, it was not so well regarded by local community 
members many of whom were ambivalent or outright cynical in their evaluations.  For 
example, according to interviewees: 
It’s all about money. (J) 
I know people on it but don’t really ever hear them liaising with anyone. (29HT) 
I think it’s sort of set up because you have to do that, you have to have that sort of 
thing. (LX) 
 [The] Community Liaison Committee I think is just a bit of a token gesture by RNO. 
I don't think it's got a lot going for it.  It was just more and more of a begging 
committee with a cap in hand to give us a few shackles I think, wasn't it? (M 45 RT). 
Informing these evaluations was a clear sense that “it doesn't have any power” (F 45RT). 
Tellingly, in the words of one participant, “not a lot happens at CLC meetings, nothing 
tangible” (KR).  Its power, as suggested above, resides not so much in local ‘outcomes’, 
beyond ensuring the absence of overt local resistance, as in providing a basis for the ongoing 
claim to a corporate wide SLO.   
In terms of the production of hegemonic stability the local experience indicates the presence 
of interests divergent from those of the corporation along with a corporate emphasis on 
community adaptation to/alignment with corporate practices and the outcomes of mineral 
production in the area (ie extensive local change and disadvantage).  The Community Liaison 
Committee, associated community grant scheme, and the Jerdacuttup Working Group can be 
read as a substantive concession to (anticipated) social pressure while community/local 
government/firm interactions suggest a degree of economic and political coercion.    
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Configuring the ‘responsible’ network: corporate reportage and (upscaling) the SLO 
Corporate sustainability reports have been widely critiqued for not only circumscribing and 
depoliticising social and environmental issues but also for deflecting, if not taking the place 
of, state regulation (see discussion in Welker 2009).    At the same time, it should not be 
assumed that these documents are read uncritically, if at all, by their various audiences 
whether they are internal corporate readers or external public groups such as journalists and 
NGOs.9    Nevertheless, they continue to be produced, at great expense.  As Welker (2009) 
observes in regard to Newmont’s internal assessment of its social and environmental 
performance, one purpose of which was to provide material for use in the annual public 
reporting to stakeholders,10 the practice is in part about auditors’ attempts to “unify the 
corporation’s mine sites in relation to standards rooted in universalising categories and values 
(eg human rights) while also trying to account for heterogenous elements in their particularity 
(eg indigenous peoples, environmental activists, social risks).” Thus the practice and 
outcomes of social performance auditing can have corporate intra-firm consequences. 
Following Quastel (2011: 454) it could be argued that these reports “provide information to 
actors concerning how the network is structured and its effects.” In particular, he (2011:454) 
argues: 
Certification standards, verification procedures, reports, documents, newspaper stories 
and advertisements are active participants in networks: they provide narratives of how 
the network operates and ought to operate and in doing so they also constitute the 
network, its structures and effects (Quastel 2011:454).  
The production and circulation of knowledge, enacted in these texts, as Quastel (2011) also 
notes, can play a part in the stabilisation and arrangement of networks.   
 
BHP Billiton’s annual ‘community and sustainability reports’ as they are currently 
collectively named on the BHP Billiton website are publically available dating back to 2001 
when BHP Ltd and Billliton Plc merged to form BHP Billiton.  Informed by the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) index, these reports incorporate in a relatively consistent manner 
components such as the “BHP Billiton locations map” (since 2002) and “Our Resources at 
Work” (since 2003).   The reports, individually and collectively, contribute to a sense of the 
corporation as a unified, networked and ‘responsible’ entity across space and time.   The 
“BHP Billiton Locations Map”  presents readers with a blank world map (just the outline of 
landmasses) upon which BHP Billiton corporate centres, technology centres, marketing 
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offices, mineral exploration offices and individual mine sites are marked through the use of 
colour-coded, numbered dots. In this manner the corporation’s global reach (all landmasses 
carry these dots) and the density of its presence (the Australian landmass is thick with dots) 
can be grasped at a glance.  These reports also circulate select knowledge and discourses 
about Ravensthorpe’s place/location within this network. The 2005 report (as illustrative 
example) and also the locally-distributed Community Newsletters, pinpoint RNO as one of 
‘BHP Billiton’s Locations’ with its own coloured dot and number.  Further, RNO is explicitly 
incorporated into the “Stainless Steel Materials” division.  The reports’ “Our Resources at 
Work” schemas list a variety of uses for nickel including in energy production, construction, 
industry, household appliances and personal use.  In this way RNO and the other extraction 
sites in the BHP Billiton nickel GPN are linked to down-stream networks of consumption and 
supply. As Massey (2005) has argued, maps play an important role in ‘taming the spatial’ and 
creating order; as selective ‘technologies of power’ maps are used in these reports and other 
public documents to construct a story of BHP Billiton as a rational and ordered global 
network of (in practice semi-autonomous) sites, which RNO is a part, in turn linked to 
broader networks of production and consumption.  
 
More substantially, BHP Billiton appropriates the Ravensthorpe local engagement strategy 
and experience as a corporate “case study” in its 2005 sustainability report.  Via inclusion as 
one of six, featured ‘socio-economic case studies,’ Ravensthorpe Shire more broadly is 
positioned as part of a BHP Billiton network of not only mine operations but also of host 
communities in which BHP Billiton, and not ‘just’ the individual operation, has secured an 
SLO.  Photographs of Ravensthorpe landscapes, with captions such as ‘The pristine coast of 
south east Western Australia’ and ‘Broad acre farming’ are included as part of the ‘case 
study’.  Interestingly, given the focus on social dimensions, these photographs are devoid of 
people while suggesting a pristine geography, including agricultural production, which the 
presence of the mine site/RNO has not changed. In particular, the Community Liaison 
Committee is showcased in the case study as evidence of RNO’s exemplary community 
engagement strategy; as noted in the literature on the SLO it is not unusual for community 
engagement to be conflated with the SLO.  From BHP Billiton’s perspective the Community 
Liaison Committee demonstrates the way in which “relationship building is key to managing 
socio-economic impacts” (BHPB 2005: 375).   
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This relationship-building, the extent of which is limited in the report to the existence of the 
Community Liaison Committee, is presented as addressing a number of business-centric 
“challenges”: namely, “Facilitating liaison between large state government agencies and 
small local governments in regional Western Australia” and “Securing partnering assistance 
from the Australian Government to deliver community infrastructure to rural and regional 
Western Australia” (BHPB 2005: 377). The formation of the Community Liaison Committee, 
not only enables the corporation to speak on behalf of the local community—“All members 
agree that it [the Community Liaison Committee] is an effective and useful body that is 
assisting the community to adapt positively to the forecast changes” (2005:377)—but also 
enables an assertion of community support (irrespective of local perspectives) and an implied 
SLO leading to/underpinning advantageous firm-state relations.  Significantly, in terms of 
constructing corporate community alignment necessary to hegemonic stability, the existence 
of this committee is in the report (2005:376) attributed to the firm’s realisation that “locals 
were not confident that regulatory authorities would adequately address their concerns.” In 
this way a local manifestation/implementation of BHP Billiton CSR policy, and resultant 
claimed SLO, operates beyond the local scale. This local undertaking, and the presence of a 
pro-actively sought SLO it is used to signify, facilitates not only resource access at the state 
and national scales but also favourable conditions of access.    
 
At the same time, Ravensthorpe is just one of six such ‘socio-economic’ case-studies. The 
other five case studies appropriated and deployed by BHP Billiton in the ‘socio-economic’ 
section of the report include highly-disparate local communities in South Africa, Chile, 
Canada, and Mozambique along with a Global Supplier Forum in Melbourne Australia.   
Collectively these communities and places demonstrate not only the “quality” and breadth of 
BHP Billiton’s SLO, but also the global (normative) “fit” of its policies and practices in 
achieving this license. In featuring these communities as part of the BHP Billiton narrative 
the firm satisfies what has been identified as a central expectation on the part of the general 
public (in Australia at least): namely that local communities would be supported and looked 
after (Mason et al 2014). At the same time the firm positions itself as a leader in responding 
to, and defining, this expectation. The Shire of Ravensthorpe as “case study” is integrated 
into the “matrix of relationships” (Bair 2008: 247) that enable production.  Concurrently,  
BHP Billiton (and not ‘just’ the local  RNO site) is promoted to a potentially-global 
audience—including current and future workers, stock holders, government departments, 
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national and international regulatory bodies, NGOs—as a ‘responsible’ corporation.  The 
report not only creates a unified and normative field of host communities, but also positions 
these as part of an alliance of communities benefitted by and consenting to global mining. In 
short, this report, as do the other public reports, privilege a particular set of (paternal) social 
relations between the corporation and the various sites/ host communities of extraction 
legitimized as a result of the implied SLO.  All BHP Billiton sites, according to these annual 
documents, ‘conform’ to this normative governing logic which not only enables the 
integration of the “disparate national and subnational territories” constituting the intra-firm 
network (Coe et al 2008: 274), but may also establish the grounds upon with future access to 
‘new’ sites can be achieved.   
 
Conclusion 
This case study has traced the ways in which, in the mining industry, the notion of the SLO 
explicitly articulates and negotiates the social and political dimensions of gaining and 
maintaining stable access to the resources fundamental to ongoing production. The 
community committee and working group instigated as a core element of the CSR strategy 
implemented by RNO in the Shire of Ravensthorpe, though received poorly by local 
residents, is shown to function as a legitimated/ing mechanism through which to shape social 
relations and qualities of place conducive to competitive mining, not least as part of a 
broader, multi-scalar social licence to operate. The Community Liaison Committee, featured 
in corporate sustainability reports and online corporate media, facilitated the positioning of 
Ravensthorpe within a global geography/network of ‘host’ communities collectively 
signifying a hegemonic global licence to operate, as necessary to the ongoing reproduction of 
a stable production network.   
 
The corporate mobilisation of its practices through inclusion of Ravensthorpe as example of 
best practice and attendant normalisation of the SLO across the production network is 
contradicted by local experiences.  This contradiction is indicative not only of corporate 
socio-economic power—and of power asymmetries in place beyond the corporation—but 
also highlights the fault lines in community abilities to ‘award’ an SLO along with the role of 
the SLO in silencing local dissent. The paper has thus suggested something of the ways in 
which the SLO notion (via associated CSR practices) facilitates the effective subordinate 
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positioning of local communities and places in producer-driven minerals industry global 
production networks.  
 
Consequently, this case study suggests the importance of addressing informal regulatory 
strategies in global production network analytical approaches and, in particular, in relation to 
the maintenance of asymmetrical, yet dialogic, power relationships underpinning the 
inclusion of places of production into global networks / network imaginaries.  While the CSR 
strategies are enacted in the local community as a means to deflect risk associated with the 
expectations of non-firm actors, their deployment as part of the broader social license creates 
a multi-scalar effect so that this risk is addressed both locally and more broadly throughout 
the production network.  As part of this, local communities and places were mobilised to 
extend the firm’s business goals and potentially its competitive position in relation to future 
access to nickel reserves in either sites in Australia and further afield by virtue of the 
company’s reputation. The notion (and deployment) of the SLO demonstrates multi-scalar 
effects of corporate power beyond traditional inter-firm and firm-state relations.   
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Endnotes 
1. In Australia, ‘Shire’ refers to a geographical area of local government.  Local shires 
(or councils as they are also known) are responsible for community needs and deal 
with such things as recreation facilities, waste collection, and town planning.  
Frequently, Shires include a town of the same name. In this case the seat of local 
government in the Shire of Ravensthorpe is the town of Ravensthorpe. In the interests 
of brevity the Shire is referred to collectively as simply ‘Ravensthorpe’.   
2. Note however that Prno and Slocombe (2012) and Prno’s (2013)  definition of the 
SLO while very similar to this dominant definition, refers to ‘society’ more broadly in 
place of ‘local community’ 
3. Somewhat contradictorily, community engagement is not only closely linked to the 
mitigation of risk associated with barriers to access and impediments to production 
but is also perceived as a potential risk.  This corporate perception derives from the 
idea that community expectations increase as a result of engagement (RNO 
community liaison staff member; Owen and Kemp 2013).  
4. Community relations and engagement with Indigenous groups in the Australian 
mining sector tend to be addressed by separate programs, as was the case with the 
RNO mine.   
5. These have their origins in work around global commodity chains (GCC).  For 
detailed critical overviews of these various frameworks and points of distinction, their 
interrelationships, epistemological origins, and the debates around their specific 
strengths and weaknesses see Bair 2008 and, more recently and through an 
international political economy lens, Wilson 2013). 
6. This mobility is of course relative to industry specific factors such as entry barriers in 
new sites and so on (see Gibbon et al 2008). 
7. For details and analysis of these transformations see author publications (not named 
for blind review).    
8. Many respondents refer to ‘BHP’: this harks back to the company’s Australian origins 
in the 1800s as ‘Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited’ and later high public 
profile in Australia. In 2001 BHP merged with the South African ‘Billiton’ 
corporation.  
9. Note that the auditors in Welker’s research did not see the report as a primary 
outcome of the audit. 
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10. Welker (2009), for example, recounts mining executive’s anecdote about an activist 
group which takes care to return such reports to the firm unopened.  
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